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The Default Mode Network (DMN) has been found to be involved in various domains of
cognitive and social processing. The present article will review brain connectivity results
related to the DMN in the fields of social understanding of others: emotion perception,
empathy, theory of mind, and morality. Most of the reviewed studies focused on healthy
subjects with no neurological and psychiatric disease, but some studies on patients with
autism and psychopathy will also be discussed. Common results show that the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) plays a key role in the social understanding of others, and the
subregions of the MPFC contribute differently to this function according to their roles in
different subsystems of the DMN. At the bottom, the ventral MPFC in the medial temporal
lobe (MTL) subsystem and its connections with emotion regions are mainly associated
with emotion engagement during social interactions. Above, the anterior MPFC (aMPFC)
in the cortical midline structures (CMS) and its connections with posterior and anterior
cingulate cortex contribute mostly to making self-other distinctions. At the top, the dorsal
MPFC (dMPFC) in the dMPFC subsystem and its connection with the temporo-parietal
junction (TPJ) are primarily related to the understanding of other’s mental states. As
behaviors become more complex, the related regions in frontal cortex are located higher.
This reflects the transfer of information processing from automatic to cognitive processes
with the increase of the complexity of social interaction. Besides the MPFC and TPJ, the
connectivities of posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) also show some changes during tasks
from the four social fields. These results indicate that the DMN is indispensable in the
social understanding of others.
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INTRODUCTION
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK AND SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING OF
OTHERS
Human beings are social animals that have a tendency to interpret
stimuli according to their possible social relevance, and spend a
huge amount of time assessing one’s own and other’s social rela-
tionships and positions by engaging in activities such as thinking
about oneself and others and exchanging those thoughts during
the whole of life (Schilbach et al., 2008). Dunbar and coleagues
suggested a “social brain hypothesis,” which deemed that the large
brains observed in primates reflected the computational demands
of the complex social systems that characterized the order of their
members (Dunbar, 1993).
In the past two decades, the social brain of human has
been intensively studied in several different domains: (1) under-
standing others, (2) understanding oneself, (3) controlling one-
self, and (4) the processes that occur at the interface of self
and others (Lieberman, 2007). However, in the strictest sense,
social cognition is about understanding of other people, includ-
ing their emotional, mental, psychological status, and behav-
iors (Lieberman, 2007). Increasing studies have shown that
regions of the default mode network (DMN) largely activate
in tasks requiring participants to understand and interact with
others, such as perceiving and interpreting other’s emotion sta-
tus, showing empathy to other people, inferring other’s belief and
intention, and performing moral judgments on other’s behav-
ior (Schilbach et al., 2008; Laird et al., 2011). Besides overlaps
with the DMN, the large scale brain networks for social domains
also contain several regions outside the DMN, since these social
behaviors usually comprise extensive cognitive processes such as
obtaining, retrieving, and processing information about the lives,
relationships, and mental states of others (Mars et al., 2012).
In the present article we will review results related to the DMN
in the field of social understanding of others using brain con-
nectivity methods. Several important fields of social behavior,
emotion perception, empathy, theory of mind (ToM, or men-
talizing), and morality, will be summarized for both healthy
subjects and patients with autism, psychopathy and schizophre-
nia (see Table 1). The existing results were organized through two
aspects. The first one is how the regions within the DMN inter-
act with each other when people perform those social tasks, and
the second one is how the DMN interacts with other distributed
brain systems that contribute to the process of social cognition of
others. Possible future directions will be discussed at the end.
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Table 1 | Brain connectivity studies on the social understanding of others.
Study Paradigm Method Connectivity Connectivity between Number Results
within the DMN DMN and other regions of subjects
EMOTION PERCEPTION
Etkin et al., 2006 Emotional stroop
task
EC, PPI,
voxel-wise DCM
rostral
ACC-amygdala
19 ↑EC from rACC to
amygdala during high
conflict, the strength
predicted successful
conflict resolution
Passamonti
et al., 2008
Emotional faces
gender decision
EC, PPI,
voxel-wise DCM
vACC-amygdala 21 EC from vACC to amygdala
negatively correlated to
reward-drive score
Das et al., 2005 Fear perception FC, PPI,
seed-based
vACC, and dACC
with thalamus–
sensory cortex
pathway, and
thalamus–
amygdala
pathway
28 Positive modulation from
dACC and negative
relationship from vACC on
thalamus–sensory cortex
pathway; both dorsal and
vACC had inverse
interaction with
thalamus–amygdala
pathway
Cremers et al.,
2010
Emotional faces
gender decision
FC, PPI,
voxel-wise
dMPFC-
amygdala;
ACC-amygdala
60 Neuroticism scores
positively correlated with
FC of dMPFC-right
amygdala for angry and
fearful faces, and
negatively correlated with
FC of ACC-left amygdala
for angry, fearful, and sad
faces
Satterthwaite
et al., 2011
Emotion
identification
FC, PPI,
voxel-wise
Medial
OFC-amygdala,
MPFC-amygdala
39 Positive FC of medial
OFC-amygdala, and
negative FC of
MPFC-amygdala during
task
Kleinhans et al.,
2008
Face
identification
FC, seed-based PCC-FFA 47 (24 autistic) ↓FC in ASD group
Rudie et al.,
2012
View emotional
face expressions
FC, seed-based vMPFC-rIFGpo 47 (23 autistic) ↓negative FC in ASD group
EMPATHY
Decety et al.,
2008
View pain
scenarios
EC, PPI,
voxel-wise
Medial OFC-right
TPJ,
ParaCC-right TPJ
Medial
OFC-anterior
IPS, precentral
sulcus, and
anterior MCC;
ParaCC-anterior
IPS, and
precentral sulcus
17 ↑EC during condition of
pain which was caused
intentionally compared to
pain which occurred
accidentally
Otti et al., 2010 View pain
scenarios
FC, ICA Within anterior
DMN
19 ↓FC from “No Pain” to
“Pain,” and the strength
positively correlated with
the subjective post-scan
pain
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Study Paradigm Method Connectivity Connectivity between Number Results
within the DMN DMN and other regions of subjects
Zaki et al., 2007 Experience self
pain, and view
other pain
FC, PPI,
voxel-wise
MPFC, PCC-AI,
dACC
19 ↑FC from self pain task to
other pain task
Cheng et al.,
2007
View pain
scenarios
FC, PPI,
seed-based
MPFC-insula 28 (14 experts) ↑negative FC in the
experts compared to
control
Meyer et al.,
2013
View social pain
scenarios
FC, PPI,
voxel-wise
MPFC-AI,
MPFC-dACC
16 ↑FC for the friend’s
exclusion
Gu et al., 2010 View pain
scenarios
FC, PPI,
seed-based
Superior MPFC-
frontoinsula
18 ↓FC under the context of
painful stimuli
Cox et al., 2012 Self-report of
empathy
FC, seed-based Perigenual
ACC-left
amygdala
38 Dominance of affective
empathy was related to
stronger positive FC,
dominance of cognitive
empathy was related to
stronger negative FC
Akitsuki and
Decety, 2009
View pain
scenarios
FC, PPI,
voxel-wise
Medial
OFC-amygdala,
precuneus-
amygdala
26 ↑FC of medial OFC-left
amygdala, precuneus-left
amygdala during painful
situations caused
intentionally
THEORY OF MIND
Atique et al.,
2011
Emotion,
intention ToM
FC, seed-based vMPFC-anterior
TPJ
24 ↑FC of vMPFC-anterior
TPJ during emotion
mentalizing
Burnett and
Blakemore, 2009
Imagine basic
and social
emotional
experience
FC, PPI,
seed-based,
voxel-wise
Anterior rostral
MPFC-pSTS/TPJ
28 (10 adults) ↑FC during social emotion
both in adolescents and
adults, and ↑FC in
adolescents compared to
adults during social
emotion
Mason et al.,
2008
Read passages FC, seed-based MPFC-TPJ Left hemisphere
language
network-ToM
network
36 (10 autistic) ↓FC between left MPFC
and right TPJ, as well as
left hemisphere language
network and ToM network,
during intentional inference
condition in the autistic
group
Baumgartner
et al., 2012
Punish people
for violating
social norms
FC, PPI,
Seed-based
dMPFC-left TPJ 16 Negative correlation
between FC of dMPFC-left
TPJ and third-party
punishment of defecting in
group members
Das et al., 2012 Infer states of
two moving
triangles
FC, ICA Posterior
DMN-lateral
fronto-temporal
networks and
insula
45 (23 schizophrenic) ↓FC in schizophrenic
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Study Paradigm Method Connectivity Connectivity between Number Results
within the DMN DMN and other regions of subjects
Herve et al.,
2012
Comprehend
affective speech
FC, seed-based MPFC-TPJ “Medial”
network
–“Language”
network,
amygdala
51 Interaction between
language (inferior frontal,
and temporal areas), ToM
(MPFC, TPJ), and emotion
processing network
observed during emotional
speech comprehension
Lombardo et al.,
2010
ToM judgments
about self or a
familiar
non-close other
FC, seed-based 33 vMPFC, PCC/precuneus,
and TPJ exhibited same FC
patterns during mentalizing
of both self and other
MORALITY
Pujol et al., 2012 Resting state,
moral dilemma,
stroop task
FC, seed-based MPFC-PCC 44 (22 psychopaths) ↓FC during resting state in
psychopathic group
Craig et al., 2009 DTI OFC-amygdala 27 (18 psychopaths) ↓FA of the uncinate
fasciculus in psychopaths
Marsh et al.,
2011
Moral judgment
implicit
association
FC, seed-based rACC/OFC-
amygdala
28 (14 psychopaths) ↓FC during task
performance in
psychopaths
Decety et al.,
2012a
View moral
scenarios
FC, PPI,
seed-based
vMPFC-TPJ vMPFC-
amygdala
126 ↑FC of vMPFC-amygdala
with age when viewing
intentional harm, ↑FC of
vMPFC-pSTS/TPJ while
viewing moral actions in
adults compared to
adolescents
Verdejo-Garcia
et al., 2012
Resting state,
moral dilemma
FC, seed-based
cross-correlation
analysis
ACC-thalami 24 (cocaine users) ↓FC during resting state in
cocaine-dependent
subjects
Shannon et al.,
2011
FC, IDEA DMN-PMdr 202 (107 offenders) FC positively correlated
with impulsivity score in
juvenile offenders, while
negatively correlated with
age in typical developing
individuals
PPI, psychophysiologic interaction analyses; DCM, dynamic causal modeling; ICA, independent component analysis; IDEA, iterative data-driven evolutionary algo-
rithm; FC, functional connectivity; EC, effective connectivity; ASD, autism spectrum disorder; DTI, diffusion tensor imaging; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; vMPFC,
ventral medial prefrontal cortex; dMPFC, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; rACC, rostral anterior cin-
gulate cortex; vACC, ventral anterior cingulate cortex; dACC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; OFC, orbital frontal cortex; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction area; IPS,
intraparietal sulcus; MCC, midcingulate cortex; ParaCC, paracingulate cortex; AI, anterior insula; pSTS, posterior superior temporal sulcus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus;
MTG, middle temporal gyrus; PMdr, dorsolateral premotor cortex; AG, angular gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; FFA, fusiform face area; rIFGpo, the right pars
opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus; PHC, parahippocampal cortex.
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
The DMN is an anatomically defined brain system that pref-
erentially activates when individuals are not focused on the
external environment (Buckner et al., 2008). Core areas of the
DMN include the medial posterior cortex [specifically the pos-
terior cingulate cortex (PCC) and parts of the precuneus], medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), as well as bilateral inferior parietal
lobule (IPL) expanding to posterior temporal areas around the
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). Apart from these core areas,
hippocampus and adjacent regions in the medial temporal lobe
(MTL) and lateral temporal cortex (LTC) extending toward the
temporal pole (TP) are also often reported as part of the DMN
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(Shulman et al., 1997; Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010b) (see Figure 1).
The DMN was originally identified in a meta-analysis map-
ping brain areas that showed increased activity during passive
tasks compared to active tasks in block-design positron emission
tomography (PET) studies (Shulman et al., 1997). Three kinds of
activity patterns within the DMNhave been found since then. The
first one is consistently decreased activity when subjects engage
in goal-directed tasks as compared to control states (Gusnard
and Raichle, 2001; Greicius et al., 2003); the second one is the
high intrinsic activity during resting states with the eyes closed or
visually fixating without engagement in any specific task (Raichle
et al., 2001; Greicius et al., 2003; Beckmann et al., 2005); and the
last one is the striking overlap between the DMN and regions
activated in social cognitive tasks (Schilbach et al., 2008; Eickhoff
et al., 2009).
So far, evidence have been found that brain regions within the
DMN contribute to specialized functions organized into subsys-
tems that converge on hubs. Buckner et al. (2008) pointed out
that the DMN consisted of at least two interacting subsystems:
the MTL subsystem containing both the hippocampal forma-
tion (HF) and parahippocampal cortex (PHC); and the core
MPFC subsystem including the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial
cortex (PCC/Rsp), ventral MPFC (vMPFC), and IPL. They pro-
posed that the MTL subsystem was associated with mnemonic
processes and activated during successful retrieval of old infor-
mation, and theMPFC subsystem was activated in tasks requiring
participants to engage in self-relevant mental simulations. Using
FIGURE 1 | The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) plays a key role in the
social understanding of others. The subregions of MPFC belong to
different subsystems of DMN. At the bottom, the ventral MPFC is in the
medial temporal lobe subsystem (green) and its connections with emotion
regions are mainly associated with emotion engagement during social
interactions. Above, the anterior MPFC is in the cortical midline structures
(yellow) and its connections with posterior and anterior cingulate cortex
contribute mostly to making self-other distinctions. At the top, the dorsal
MPFC (dMPFC) is in the dMPFC subsystem (blue) and its connection with
the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) are primarily related to understanding
others’ mental states (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b). The orange clusters
show the anterior insula and amygdala, which contribute greatly in the
social understanding of others.
memories and associations from past experiences as its building
blocks, the DMN participated in constructing self-relevant men-
tal simulations that were exploited by a wide range of cognitive
functions including remembering the past, thinking about the
future, and conceiving the current viewpoint of others. Andrews-
Hanna and colleagues further suggested that the DMN consisted
of two subsystems that interacted with a common core system (see
Figure 1): one was the dorsal MPFC (dMPFC) subsystem com-
prising the dMPFC, TPJ, LTC, and TP; and the other was theMTL
subsystem comprising the HF, PHC, Rsp, vMPFC, and posterior
IPL. The dMPFC subsystem was selectively activated when par-
ticipants considered one’s own and others’ present mental states,
whereas the MTL subsystem showed preferential activity when
participants simulated the future using mnemonic imagery-based
processes. Both of these two subsystems were strongly correlated
with a midline common core system consisting of the anterior
MPFC (aMPFC) and PCC, which is usually activated when peo-
plemake self-relevant affective decisions. Themidline core system
interacted with the MTL subsystem and the dMPFC subsys-
tem to facilitate the construction of mental models of personally
significant events (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b).
MEASURING BRAIN CONNECTIVITY IN THE DMN
An increasing number of researchers are interested in the brain
connectivity among the DMN regions and have applied several
newly developed approaches and methodologies to DMN stud-
ies. In the functional connectivity (FC) approach, researchers
compute the statistical interrelation of neurophysiological time
series representing temporal changes in different brain regions,
and examine the stimulus-dependent and -independent synchro-
nizations and interactions between these regions (Friston, 2005;
Menon, 2011). In the effective connectivity (EC) approach, data
can be obtained by dynamic causal modeling (DCM), which esti-
mates and judges the negative or positive impacts of one region
on another and how such impacts are affected by experimental
context (Aertsen et al., 1989; Friston, 2002). Granger causality
and other similar methods, unlike the bidirectional functional
connectivity, which is a model-free concept, computes the uni-
directional EC and emphasizes asymmetric causal interactions
between neural systems. Granger causality estimates forward
(bottom-up) vs. backward (top-down) connectivity between
diverse regions. Nevertheless, it has been criticized for the lack of
a biologically-based generative model and likelihood of obtaining
pseudo estimated “causality” that is in fact induced by systematic
differences across brain areas in hemodynamic lag (Friston, 2009;
Smith et al., 2011). Functional and effective connectivity can be
studied through both linear techniques (correlation coefficient,
coherence) and non-linear techniques (phase synchronization,
generalized synchronization) (Stam and van Straaten, 2012). It
is worth noting that, negative correlations in brain connectiv-
ity analysis, sometimes referred to as anti-correlations, must be
cautiously interpreted since they are usually present only after
regressing whole-brain signals. This raises a point of contro-
versy: whole-brain normalization leads to a bell-shaped corre-
lation value distribution centered on zero, thereby guaranteeing
negative correlations even if such correlations were not initially
present in the data (Murphy et al., 2009; van Dijk et al., 2010).
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A brain network can also be defined on the basis of structural
connectivity through Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) mor-
phology andDiffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI) tractography in vivo
or tracer studies on postmortem tissue. Structural connectivity
denotes a network of anatomical links and places constraints on
which functional and effective interactions occur in the network
(Bullmore and Sporns, 2009; Bressler and Menon, 2010; Menon,
2011).
BRAIN CONNECTIVITY STUDIES ON DMN AND SOCIAL
UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS
EMOTION PERCEPTION
Emotion plays a crucial role in human social cognition. Perceiving
and interpreting other people’s emotion status is one of the most
important steps during social interaction. Traditional studies on
the neural mechanism of emotion adopted a locationist approach,
which asserted that each basic emotion faculty has its own special-
ized neural circuitry that is architecturally distinct, inborn, and
shared with other animals (Panksepp, 2004). Early neuroimaging
results were indeed congruent with this assumption, for example
amygdala for fear (Adolphs et al., 1995), insula for disgust (Wicker
et al., 2003), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for anger (Murphy et al.,
2003), and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for sad-
ness (Murphy et al., 2003). However, several recent meta-analyses
and reviews favored the psychological constructionist approach,
which suggested that a set of interacting brain regions involved
in the basic psychological operations of both emotional and non-
emotional processing were activated during emotion experience
and perception (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al.,
2012). Yet co-activation of different brain regions does not nec-
essarily mean connectivity between them, so the evidence for the
constructionist approach is inconclusive and brain connectivity
results would be critical for examining this approach.
Most emotion perception studies using brain connectivity
methods revealed changes between the DMN and other brain sys-
tems, especially between the prefrontal cortex and amygdala. In a
gender discrimination task of angry and neutral faces, Passamonti
et al. (2008) confirmed that the interaction between the ventral
ACC and amygdala was influenced by the drive to obtain reward,
with reduced negative connectivity in high reward-drive partici-
pants. The direction of this effect was limited to connection from
the ventral ACC to the amygdala but not vice versa. Moreover,
in another study, the rostral ACC was negatively coupled with the
amygdala in high vs. low conflict resolution trials of a classic emo-
tion Stroop task with fearful and happy faces, and the strength
of the connectivity predicted successful conflict resolution (Etkin
et al., 2006). Studies also found that the connectivity between dif-
ferent subregions of the MPFC and amygdala may make diverse
effects on emotion function. For example, when people did a fear
perception task, there was a dorsal-ventral division in ACC mod-
ulation of the thalamus-sensory cortex pathway, with a positive
modulation of this pathway from dorsal ACC and a negative one
from the ventral ACC (Das et al., 2005). In addition, Satterthwaite
et al. (2011) demonstrated that the amygdala responded prefer-
entially to threatening (fearful or angry) faces and had increased
connectivity during threat trials with the OFC. Moreover, a
study also showed that the neuroticism scores of subjects were
negatively related to the left amygdala-ACC connectivity, but pos-
itively associated with the right amygdala-dorsomedial prefrontal
connectivity, when processing negative emotional facial expres-
sions (angry and fearful compared to neutral faces) (Cremers
et al., 2010).
Besides the prefrontal cortex and amygdala, functional con-
nectivity changes between other regions were also found in autism
patients. For example, in a facial expression identification task,
the healthy control group had significantly increased connectiv-
ity between the fusiform face area and PCC compared to autism
patients (Kleinhans et al., 2008). In another study requiring
subjects to passively view emotional facial expressions, typically
developing children showed an anticorrelation between the right
pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (rIFGpo) and the
DMN, whereas autistic children showed a similar anticorrelated
relationship between the rIFGpo and the posterior portion of the
DMN, but not the anterior portion of the DMN (vMPFC) (Rudie
et al., 2012).
General speaking, the FC in emotion perception studies con-
centrated on the relation between the vMPFC (including parts
of ACC), and other emotion-related areas, mainly the amyg-
dala and insula. The DMN has been theorized to make sensory
inputs meaningful as “situated conceptualizations” for distinct
emotions, since it reconstitutes past experiences for use in the
present (Lindquist and Barrett, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012). The
vMPFC, as part of the DMN, is believed to receive reinforce-
ment expectancy information from emotion learning systems
that process the reinforcement provided by specific reinforcers of
emotional expressions (Blair, 2007). Thus, the above results from
functional connectivity in emotion perception may demonstrate
that the vMPFC is indeed associated with successful regulation of
human’s emotional perception and responses.
EMPATHY
Empathy can be defined as the process to generate an isomorphic
affective state in the self to understand another individual’s emo-
tional state or condition while realizing that it is the other who
causes this affective state (Decety and Svetlova, 2012; Engen and
Singer, 2012). Neuroimaging of empathy is usually acquired by
scanning people’s brain when they fall into empathic states with
various emotions such as disgust, reward, joy, and, particularly,
pain (Jabbi et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2009; Bernhardt and Singer,
2012). Researchers proposed that at least three neural systems play
vital roles in empathy: the mirror neuron system, the affective
empathy system located in the anterior insula (AI) and midcin-
gulate cortex (MCC), and the cognitive empathy system of theory
of mind that almost overlaps with the DMN network. The affec-
tive empathy system and the cognitive empathy system are linked
through the vMPFC (Walter, 2012).
Only a few empathy studies adopted brain connectivity meth-
ods to investigate the FC within the DMN, most of which were
studying pain. For instance, although temporal correlation anal-
ysis demonstrated that the anterior DMN (aDMN) was deacti-
vated in both the “Pain” and “No Pain” conditions compared to
the resting-state, the decrease of connectivity was significantly
stronger in the “No Pain” than “Pain” condition. In addition,
independent component analysis (ICA) demonstrated that higher
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integration of the left medial OFC into the aDMN was associated
with higher post-scan pain ratings (Otti et al., 2010).
Most of empathy studies focused on the connection between
the DMN (e.g., MPFC) and other regions, especially the insula.
When participants watched short videos of other people suffer-
ing painful injuries, the brain area of dMPFC and PCC showed
greater connectivity with the dorsal ACC and AI than when par-
ticipants received noxious thermal stimulation (Zaki et al., 2007).
In another study, subjects were asked to view color photographs
describing human body parts in painful or non-painful situations
and then judge whether the personwas suffering from pain or not.
Results revealed that the frontoinsular cortex showed decreased
FC with the superior MPFC in response to the painful compared
to non-painful stimuli (Gu et al., 2010). Moreover, observing a
friend experiencing social exclusion would trigger greater inten-
sity of FC between the MPFC and both the dorsal ACC and
bilateral insula than observing a stranger doing so (Meyer et al.,
2013). Furthermore, Cheng et al. (2007) proposed that medical
experts who applied painful procedures in their practice could
regulate the unpleasant feelings generated by perceiving others
in pain through modulating attentional demands. In accord with
this hypothesis, experts showed negative FC between the MPFC
and AI, whereas the controls showed no significant correlation
with the MPFC.
As to the relationship between the amygdala and MPFC in
empathy, studies found that the FC pattern between the amyg-
dala and other brain areas was modulated by social context. For
instance, the medial OFC and precuneus showed stronger covari-
ation with the left amygdala when the visual stimulus was one per-
son in a painful situation caused by another individual than when
the situation was caused by accident (Akitsuki and Decety, 2009).
Cox et al. (2012) argued that relative empathic ability (REA), the
difference between affective empathy and cognitive empathy, is
a useful index for empathy ability. Their results showed that the
dominance of affective empathy was associated with stronger FC
among social-emotional regions (ventral anterior insula, OFC,
amygdala, perigenual ACC), whereas the dominance of cognitive
empathy was related to stronger FC among areas implicated in
social-cognitive regions (brainstem, STS, ventral anterior insula).
The FC differences found in empathy studies may reflect
similar mechanisms as emotion perception, which involve the
vMPFC’s connection with the amygdala and insula (Akitsuki and
Decety, 2009; Otti et al., 2010). Empathy has a deep evolutionary
foundation stemming from the phylogenetically ancient practice
of parental care, which assists the propagation of genetic legacy
to future generations. The motivational systems originally devel-
oped to care for one’s offspring have gradually been used to
facilitate positive relationships between unrelated group mem-
bers. Ultimately, empathy became a useful means of forming
and maintaining strong social bonds between unrelated individ-
uals (Decety et al., 2012b). By enabling human beings to feel the
suffering of others, empathy can promote affective interactions
and contribute to prosocial behaviors toward other conspecifics,
depending on relevant social contexts and social relationships
(Decety and Porges, 2011). Thus, it is very important for humans
to identify the real protagonist of emotion—the one who causes
this affective state. It follows that empathy, to a great extent,
is based on emotion perception. Consistent with this line of
thought, the region in the frontal cortex that is strongly impli-
cated in both empathy and emotion perception is the aMPFC
(Cheng et al., 2007; Otti et al., 2010; Cox et al., 2012; Meyer et al.,
2013), which takes charge of the self-other distinction. There are
also some other areas connected with the dMPFC (Zaki et al.,
2007; Gu et al., 2010), which contribute to the recognition of
other humans’ mental states.
THEORY OF MIND
Theory of mind refers to the ability to explain, predict, and
interpret another person’s behavior by attributing affective and
cognitive mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions and
emotions to other people (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Abu-Akel
and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Krause et al., 2012). The machin-
ery of ToM involves at least three basic processes: representing
cognitive and affective mental states, attributing these mental
states to others, and finally applying (or deploying) these mental
states to correctly comprehend and forecast behavior (Abu-Akel
and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). A number of neuroimaging stud-
ies have demonstrated the crucial role of the MPFC in ToM
tasks (Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004; Uddin et al., 2007; Qin and
Northoff, 2011). Some researchers also declared that ToM was
subserved by the posterior DMN (pDMN) regions. For instance,
Saxe argued that the right TPJ was vital for representing men-
tal states, particularly false beliefs (Saxe, 2006), and Samson and
colleagues proposed that the left TPJ (coupled with the frontal
lobes) was crucial for the representation of mental states (Samson
et al., 2004). In general, neuroimaging studies have identified a
common pattern of brain activation underlying autobiographical
memory, ToM, and the DMN (Fair et al., 2008; Spreng et al., 2009;
Spreng and Grady, 2010).
Past ToM studies investigating the brain connectivity within
the DMN revealed strong connections between the parietal and
frontal cortex. For instance, Atique and colleagues compared the
different patterns of functional connectivity between inferring
another person’s emotion (emotion mentalizing) and intention
(intention mentalizing) in the DMN. The results revealed a dou-
ble dissociation, such that a more anterior region of the right and
left TPJ was more strongly activated during emotion mentaliz-
ing and showed stronger FC with the vMPFC, whereas a more
posterior region was more strongly activated during intention
mentalizing (Atique et al., 2011). Burnett and Blakemore found
that an anterior rostral region of the MPFC (arMPFC) showed
greater connectivity with the posterior superior temporal sul-
cus (pSTS) bordering on the TPJ and anterior temporal cortex
during social emotion (such as embarrassment and guilt) than
basic emotion, which was in line with the assumption that social
emotions require the representation of another’s mental states.
They also found that the adolescent group possessed stronger
connectivity between arMPFC and pSTS/TPJ during social vs.
basic emotion than did the adult group (Burnett and Blakemore,
2009). Moreover, Mason et al. (2008) detected that the autism
group had lower functional connectivity within the DMN net-
work (between the left medial frontal gyrus and right TPJ) in the
intentional inference condition than the control group. In addi-
tion, researchers found that when subjects made the decision to
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 74 | 7
Li et al. The DMN and social understanding of others
punish in-group members and out-group members for violating
social norms (third-party punishment), the less in-group mem-
bers were punished, the stronger was the FC between the dMPFC
and left TPJ (Baumgartner et al., 2012).
Some other studies explored the connectivity between the
DMN network and other regions during ToM processing. For
example, in a study asking schizophrenia patients to infer the
social interactions of two moving triangles, FC analyses showed
that the degree of FC between task-positive (lateral fronto-
temporal network and insula) and task-negative (medial fronto-
temporal network and pDMN) regions was significantly reduced
in schizophrenia patients as compared to controls (Das et al.,
2012). Another study also detected that autistic patients had lower
FC between the DMN (the left MPFC and the right TPJ) and a
left hemisphere language network (the inferior frontal gyrus and
posterior left middle temporal gyrus) in the intentional infer-
ence condition than the control group (Mason et al., 2008).
Additionally, in a study using an affective speech comprehen-
sion task, researchers identified three functional modules with
FC analysis, including a “medial” ToM network (the MPFC and
TPJ regions), a bilateral “language” network (the inferior frontal
and temporal areas), and the bilateral amygdala. The coopera-
tion of these modules was observed during people’s emotional
speech comprehension, with the left angular gyrus playing a crit-
ical role when the medial network and the language network
interacted (Herve et al., 2012). Furthermore, Lombardo et al.
(2010) found that the vMPFC, PCC/precuneus, and TPJ all exhib-
ited the same FC patterns during mentalizing of both self and
others, which indicated that identical neural circuits were imple-
menting processes involved in the mentalizing of both self and
others.
To sum up, the main findings of ToM studies focused on
the connection between the dMPFC and TPJ (Mason et al.,
2008; Burnett and Blakemore, 2009; Baumgartner et al., 2012;
Herve et al., 2012), with few studies on the FC between vMPFC
(Lombardo et al., 2010; Atique et al., 2011) and aMPFC (Burnett
and Blakemore, 2009), as well as some other regions, such as
the insula and language network (Das et al., 2012; Herve et al.,
2012). Relative to emotion perception and empathy, ToM is con-
sidered as a relatively high-level cognitive process (Gallagher and
Frith, 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006). Many species can predict
the goals of others, while only humans and perhaps some non-
human primates can separate one’s own mental perspective from
that of others (Van Overwalle, 2009; Van Overwalle and Baetens,
2009). The process of ToM critically involves self-projection, since
we must imagine ourselves in the same situation as another per-
son and use our own experiences to simulate and understand
the mind of that person (Blakemore and Decety, 2001; Spreng
et al., 2009; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Spreng and Mar, 2012).
Hence, the ToM processes require not only representing current
and mnemonic event materials, which mainly depends on the
posterior hemisphere of the human brain, but also distinguish-
ing self from others, which is the critical function of the frontal
cortex. The involvement of dMPFC in ToM is perhaps due to
its responsibility for evaluation and decision-making processes
in self- and other-referential processing (van der Meer et al.,
2010).
MORALITY
Psychologists’ interest in the moral dimensions of life and
thoughts could date back to the dialogs of Plato and Aristotle’s
ethical treatises. In the recent 20 years, neuroscience has started
a new era for moral psychology. Neuroimaging studies have
found several brain regions related to morality, such as the ACC
(Greene et al., 2004), TPJ (Young et al., 2007, 2011; Young and
Saxe, 2008, 2009), vMPFC (Tangney et al., 2007; Zahn et al.,
2009; Moll et al., 2011), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex Greene
et al., 2004, 2008. The distributed nature of the moral network
led researchers to shift their focus from seeking domain-specific
brain regions dedicated to morality to determining the contri-
butions of domain-general processes to morality (Shenhav and
Greene, 2010; Young and Dungan, 2011). The existing results
show that the moral brain network is closely associated with the
DMN (Buckner et al., 2008; Bzdok et al., 2012; Reniers et al.,
2012).
Connectivities within the DMN have been found in some
morality studies. Decety found that the adult group showed
the strongest connectivity between the vMPFC and pSTS/TPJ
during viewing of moral actions relative to non-moral actions
when compared to other, younger groups (Decety et al., 2012a).
Harrison et al. (2008a) compared the FC within the DMN when
subjects were resting, judging moral dilemmas, or performing the
Stroop task. They found that regions within the DMN, particu-
larly the posterior and anterior cingulated cortex, showed greater
correlated activity during the moral dilemma task compared to
the resting state. Pujol and colleagues further discovered that,
in contrast with control subjects, psychopathic individuals with
documented histories of severe criminal offenses showed signifi-
cantly reduced FC between themedial frontal cortex (aDMN) and
posterior brain areas (pDMN) in the resting state (Pujol et al.,
2012).
Due to the complexity of morality, researchers are also very
interested in the relation between the DMN and other networks,
particularly the amygdala. When categorizing illegal and legal
behaviors in an implicit association moral judgment task, youths
with psychopathic traits displayed reduced FC between the amyg-
dala and the medial OFC compared with healthy controls (Marsh
et al., 2011). Decety et al. (2012a) found a positive age-related
increase of FC between the vMPFC and amygdala in response to
intentional harm. Another study reported significantly reduced
fractional anisotropy (FA), an indirect measure of microstruc-
tural integrity, in the uncinate fasciculus (white matter connec-
tions linking the amygdala and OFC) of psychopaths compared
with controls (Craig et al., 2009). Cocaine-dependent subjects
have been found to have less resting-state functional connectivity
between the ACC, thalamus, insula and the brain stem com-
pared with controls (Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2012). Furthermore,
researchers also found that the strength of the coupling between
the dorsolateral premotor cortex and the DMN was positively
correlated with the impulsivity scores in juvenile offenders but
negatively correlated with age in typically developing individuals
(Shannon et al., 2011).
Moral judgment is one of the most complex social behaviors.
It involves a variety of lower level cognitive processes, such as
distinguishing between self and others, integrating social norms,
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computing goal-directed actions, showing empathy to others and
inferring the intentions of others (Moll et al., 2008; Bzdok et al.,
2012; Feldmanhall et al., 2013). Corresponding complexity has
been shown in the above FC results. Moral judgment studies
reported FC results that not only involved areas subserving emo-
tion perception, empathy, ToM, but also other regions, such as
the FC between the medial OFC and precentral sulcus (Decety
et al., 2008), as well as the ACC and thalamus (Verdejo-Garcia
et al., 2012). However, neuroimaging studies using brain connec-
tivity methods are still scarce in the field of morality. Given the
importance of moral judgment to society, high priority should
be given to conducting more studies using the FC approach to
further explore the neural mechanisms of morality.
DISCUSSION
One of the consistent trends revealed in the above studies is that
tasks from all the related fields of social understanding of oth-
ers, from emotion perception tomorality, elicit brain connectivity
changes from the MPFC (extending to the ACC), a core region of
the DMN, to other regions either inside (e.g., TPJ or PCC) or out-
side (e.g., insula or amygdala) of the DMN. Furthermore, more
complex behaviors are subserved by brain regions which are sit-
uated higher in the frontal cortex. These results indicate that the
MPFC plays a critical role in the social understanding of others,
and different parts of MPFC take charge in distinct cognitive pro-
cesses. According to Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010b), the MPFC
can be divided into three subregions that belong to different sub-
systems of the DMN: the dMPFC in the dMPFC subsystem, the
vMPFC in the MTL subsystem and the aMPFC in the midline
common core system. The FC results reviewed in the current
article provide support for the statements above.
CONNECTIVITY FROM THE vMPFC OF THE MTL SUBSYSTEM
The vMPFC in the MTL subsystem is crucial in processing emo-
tional features during social cognition. Connectivity changes
between the vMPFC and other DMN regions (TPJ) have been
found in ToM studies and morality studies. Atique and col-
leagues found that a more anterior region of the right and left
TPJ showed strong FC with the vMPFC during emotion men-
talizing (Atique et al., 2011). In contrast, Decety et al. (2012a)
found an increase of FC between the vMPFC and pSTS/TPJ while
viewing moral actions in adults compared to adolescents. The
connection between the vMPFC and TPJ in these two fields can
be attributed to the affective aspects of ToM that enables humans
to infer emotions.
The dense connections between the vMPFC and emotional
regions (e.g., amygdala, insula) means this frontal region can
represent and regulate socioemotional states and synthesize a
diverse range of information to represent affective mental states
(Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). In all four fields, particu-
larly emotion perception and empathy, the connectivity changes
between the amygdala and vMPFC were repeatedly attested. The
detection of connectivity between these two regions, to a certain
extent, is consistent with discoveries in animal studies using fear
conditioning paradigms which affirm that these regions play a
critical role in the process of animal fear conditioning (Maren and
Quirk, 2004; Jovanovic and Ressler, 2010; Fiorenza et al., 2012).
Researchers have put forward a fear conditioning neuromech-
anism model, in which learning the conditioned responses in
the central nucleus of the amygdala is modulated by two sepa-
rate processes. One signals a positive prediction error from the
basolateral amygdala, and another signals a negative prediction
error from the vMPFC (Moustafa et al., 2013). This model is,
in part, similar to the Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model
proposed by Blair (2007), which states that relatively indepen-
dent emotion learning systems (e.g., the processing of fearful, sad
and happy expressions in the amygdala, disgust expressions in the
insula, as well as angry expressions in the inferior frontal cor-
tex) input reinforcement expectancy information to the vMPFC
while processing reinforcement provided by specific reinforcers
of emotional expressions. The vMPFC represents the informa-
tion and thus allows decision making, including moral decision
making. The reduced connectivity between the MPFC and amyg-
dala (Marsh et al., 2008; Glenn, 2011; Motzkin et al., 2011)
instead of the insula and inferior frontal cortex in psychopaths
relative to controls offers strong confirmation, as their impair-
ments when processing care-based transgressions is thought to
depend on the amygdala’s role in the association of the trans-
gression with the fear/sadness of the victim. Compared with
the IES model, the amygdala-hippocampal-prefrontal interaction
model includes the hippocampus, which is also frequently found
in emotion related studies using functional connectivity meth-
ods (Kensinger and Corkin, 2004; Smith et al., 2006), and takes
the effects of environment into account. However, there are still
many open questions. For example, what is the actual role of the
vMPFC? Does this region only signal a negative prediction error
to the central nucleus of the amygdala, as Moustafa states, or does
it play a part in successful decision making, as Blair asserts? How
do other’s emotions influence one’s own moral decision?
CONNECTIVITY FROM THE aMPFC OF THE CORTICAL MIDLINE
STRUCTURES
The aMPFC and PCC are part of the core cortical midline struc-
tures (CMS) of the DMN, which mostly contributes to the elab-
oration of the experiential feelings of self (Northoff et al., 2006,
2011; Leech et al., 2011; Pearson et al., 2011; Qin and Northoff,
2011; Denny et al., 2012; Leech and Sharp, 2013). The aMPFC
has been proposed to be critical in making self-other distinc-
tions. For example, the aMPFC activates when participants make
judgments or remember trait adjectives about themselves com-
pared to other people (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002; D’Argembeau et al.,
2005; Heatherton et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006). The above
results show the crucial role the aMPFC plays in processes of
social behavior, especially empathy. For instance, medical experts
who applied painful procedures in their practice showed negative
FC between the MPFC and AI, while controls showed no signif-
icant correlation with the MPFC (Cheng et al., 2007). It could
be interpreted that long-term practice allows the medical experts
to regulate the unpleasant feelings through self-other discrimina-
tion to identify the real protagonist of pain. In addition, observing
a friend experience social exclusion triggers greater intensity of
FC between the MPFC and both the dorsal ACC and bilateral
insula than observing a stranger doing so (Meyer et al., 2013).
This result can be explained by the logic that the concept of friend,
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as compared to stranger, is closer to the self, thus social exclusion
of a friend brings about greater FC.
CONNECTIVITY FROM THE dMPFC OF THE dMPFC SUBSYSTEM
The main results of the reviewed studies with regards to the
DMN are the associations between the dMPFC and TPJ in the
dMPFC subsystem, which were present not only in ToM (men-
talizing) but also in morality studies. Understanding complex
social interactions among people who are presumed to be social,
interactive, and emotive always involves the processing of self-
reflective thoughts and judgments (Buckner et al., 2008). Thus it
is not surprising that connections between the TPJ and dMPFC
are commonly found in these studies, since these two areas
are key regions known to be involved in inferring temporary
goals, intentions, desires, and more enduring dispositions of
others owing to previous localization results using the mental-
izing paradigm (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Mitchell et al., 2005;
Hampton et al., 2008; Steinbeis and Koelsch, 2009; Van Overwalle
and Baetens, 2009). For example, studies have shown that func-
tional connectivity between the dMPFC and TPJ increased when
healthy participants performed ToM tasks on social properties
but decreased when autistic participants did (Mason et al., 2008;
Burnett and Blakemore, 2009; Baumgartner et al., 2012).
Several different theories have been proposed to interpret
the relationship between the dMPFC and TPJ (as well as other
LTC regions such as pSTS). For example, it is suggested that
the dMPFC is associated with the internally-focused process
of considering the contents of another person’s mind, whereas
those temporal regions are related to externally-focused processes
that do not require consideration of a target’s internal states
(Lieberman, 2007). Some researchers have argued that the TPJ is
responsible for a domain-general computational mechanism for
reorienting attention to the agency (e.g., other individual) and the
MPFC is more domain specific for understanding human men-
tal states (Decety and Lamm, 2007). Others have proposed that
the TPJ is more specific for the, possibly uniquely, human abil-
ity to reason about others’ affective and cognitive mental states,
and the MPFC is more domain-general (Saxe, 2006). Thus the FC
between the TPJ and the MPFC would be an index of either shift-
ing between internally-focused and externally-focused processes
or communication between domain-general and domain-specific
processing during the understanding of others’ mental states.
CONNECTIVITY FROM OTHER REGIONS OF THE DMN
Besides the MPFC and TPJ, several studies also revealed con-
nectivity changes between the PCC/Precuneus in the CMS and
other regions within and outside the DMN (Zaki et al., 2007;
Harrison et al., 2008b; Assaf et al., 2010; Weng et al., 2010; Pujol
et al., 2012). The PCC appears sensitive not only to explicit
emotional engagement, for example, during tasks of emotional
word processing and face-perception, but also implicit emotional
engagement during self-directed attention or evaluation, as well
as autobiographical memory Leech et al., 2011, 2012; Pearson
et al., 2011; Leech and Sharp, 2013. Vogt et al. (2006) thus
proposed that the PCC may respond to the general emotional
content of events, particularly when the nature of processing is
self-relevant.
In summary, during tasks from all four social fields, emotion
perception, empathy, ToM, and moral judgments, connectivity
changes were found between the MPFC and other regions within
the DMN (e.g., TPJ, PCC) or outside the DMN (e.g., amygdala,
insula). Evidence has shown that the MPFC is closely related to
self-referential processing (Northoff et al., 2011; Wagner et al.,
2012; Moran et al., 2013). The connectivity changes between
the MPFC and other regions further confirm the viewpoint that
humans use memories and associations from past experiences
as the building blocks for understanding other’s emotional and
cognitive states. Furthermore, these studies suggest that different
parts of theMPFC undertake distinct responsibilities. Specifically,
connectivity changes between the emotion regions and vMPFC
were repeatedly found in all four fields, particularly emotion
perception and empathy; the aMPFC was found to be crucial,
especially for empathy; and the associations between the dMPFC
and TPJ were usually present in ToM (mentalizing) and moral-
ity studies. As social behaviors become more and more complex,
the involvement of related regions in the medial frontal cortex
gradually increased as well, which may reflect the transition of
information processing from automatic to effortful cognitive pro-
cesses. In consideration of all these findings, we propose that the
vMPFC is engaged in identifying self-relevant information and
assessing the salience of stimuli (Gusnard et al., 2001; Northoff
and Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006); the aMPFC takes
charge in making clear self-other distinctions (Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2010b), and the dMPFC is involved in the evaluation and
decision of whether a certain stimulus is applicable to the self or
to another (van der Meer et al., 2010).
In addition to the MPFC regions, social understanding of
others also includes cognitive processing for extracting existing
storage and perceiving immediate material to represent current
events, as well as for identifying and expressing the emotion itself.
The former is closely related to the TPJ, which is believed to help
in the establishment of a social context for a decision (Carter and
Huettel, 2013), whereas the latter is managed by the amygdala,
insula and other emotion regions. These three basic processes
interact with each other and eventually lead to the formation of
complex social behavior.
Reproducibility is a lingering issue with previous studies. For
example, Andrews-Hanna and colleagues divided the MPFC into
dMPFC, vMPFC, and aMPFC and proposed that they respectively
belong to the dMPFC subsystem, MTL subsystem, and common
core system (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010a,b). van der Meer and
colleagues further suggested that “the vMPFC is responsible for
tagging information relevant for “self,” whereas the dMPFC is
responsible for evaluation and decision-making processes in self-
and other-referential processing” (van der Meer et al., 2010).
However, other studies did not emphasize the role of aMPFC, but
instead showed that the vMPFC responds more to self, whereas
the dMPFC responds more to others (Denny et al., 2012; Wagner
et al., 2012). Compared with these studies, the present article
specifically highlights the function of self-other distinction in
the aMPFC for two main reasons: theoretically, there must be
some transition from self to others and the aMPFC anatomi-
cally connects the vMPFC and dMPFC; in practice, as we have
presented, this area has been repeatedly found to participate in
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the differentiating of self and others. However, to address the
divergence and inconsistencies between studies, more brain con-
nectivity methods such as those from graph theory, statistical
physics, and non-linear dynamics should be put to use to confirm
the relations and differences between the subregions of the MPFC
and the DMN. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and transcra-
nial direct-current stimulation should also be considered because
they can provide causal evidence to evaluate the above theories.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this article, we reviewed recent studies on the social under-
standing of others using brain connectivity methods. We focused
on the brain connectivity within and outside the DMN in four
different research fields: emotion perception, empathy, ToM, and
morality. The reviewed studies suggest that the MPFC plays a
key role in the social understanding of others, the subregions of
the MPFC contribute differently to this function according to
their roles in the different subsystems of the DMN, and more
complex behaviors are related to anatomically higher regions
in the frontal cortex. Starting from the bottom, the vMPFC in
the MTL subsystem and its connection with emotion regions
are mainly associated with emotion engagement during social
interactions. Above the vMPFC, the aMPFC in the CMS and its
connections with the PCC and ACC contribute mostly to mak-
ing self-other distinctions. At the top, the dMPFC in the dMPFC
subsystem and its connection with the TPJ are primarily associ-
ated with understanding others’ mental states. Besides the MPFC
and TPJ, the connectivities of the PCC also show some changes
during tasks from the four social fields. These results indicate
that the DMN is indispensable in the social understanding of
others.
Several points require attention during future development of
large-scale brain connectivity studies of social cognition. First of
all, interest in brain connectivity arose from the study of brain
lesions and neuropsychiatric disorders ranging from epilepsy to
autism (Menon, 2011; Shafi et al., 2012). A rich body of litera-
ture on neuropsychiatric disorders suggest that abnormalities in
the interactions of network components play a vital role in these
disorders (Lytton, 2008; Vissers et al., 2012), and damage to spe-
cific functional connectivity networks can result in corresponding
neuropsychopathy (Seeley et al., 2009). However, compared with
lesions and patient studies, there are far fewer studies on healthy
human participants applying the methods and theories of brain
connectivity, let alone in the field of social cognition. This is a
very promising approach for future work.
Secondly, most previous studies exploring the social brain
in healthy participants only computed the functional or effec-
tive connectivity among regions of interest determined by prior
experience or localization tasks, whereas a wide range of brain
connectivity methods such as those from graph theory, statistical
physics, and non-linear dynamics have been adopted in neuropsy-
chiatric disorders studies (van denHeuvel andHulshoff Pol, 2010;
Menon, 2011; Xia and He, 2011; Stam and van Straaten, 2012;
Yu et al., 2012; Griffa et al., 2013). Undoubtedly, these meth-
ods should be put to use to confirm the relations and differences
between subregions in the MPFC or the DMN and deeply explore
the complex social brain network in healthy participants.
Thirdly, so far most brain connectivity studies are con-
ducted with fMRI, a technique based mainly on correlational
evidence. However, investigating causality is the main goal of
scientific studies, so building causal models accounting for the
entire loop of social information processing within and between
brains would be a promising future direction (Singer, 2012).
Consequently, the methods for studying brain networks could
be combined with many other methodologies, such as multi-
voxel pattern analyses (Carter et al., 2012), transcranial magnetic
stimulation/transcranial direct-current stimulation (Young et al.,
2010; Carter et al., 2012), genetic-imaging approaches (Glenn,
2011), and pharmacological interventions (Sripada et al., 2012)
to explore the neural substrates of various human physiological
and psychological states during social interaction.
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